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Abstract
Adversarial attacks on deep neural networks traditionally rely on a constrained
optimization paradigm, where an optimization procedure is used to obtain a sin-
gle adversarial perturbation for a given input example. Here, we instead view
adversarial attacks as a generative modelling problem, with the goal of producing
entire distributions of adversarial examples given an unperturbed input. We show
that this generative perspective can be used to design a unified encoder-decoder
framework, which is domain-agnostic in that the same framework can be em-
ployed to attack different domains with minimal modification. Across three diverse
domains—images, text, and graphs—our approach generates whitebox attacks with
success rates that are competitive with or superior to existing approaches, with a
new state-of-the-art achieved in the graph domain. Finally, we demonstrate that our
generative framework can efficiently generate a diverse set of attacks for a single
given input, and is even capable of attacking unseen test instances in a zero-shot
manner, exhibiting attack generalization.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks on deep learning models involve adding small, often imperceptible, perturbations
to input data with the goal of forcing the model to make certain misclassifications [33]. There
are a wide-variety of settings and assumptions under which adversarial strategies are developed
(often termed the “threat model”). This includes the so-called “whitebox” setting, where the model
parameters are fully accessible to the attacker, as well as the more challenging setting of “blackbox”
attacks, where the attacker only has access to the inputs and outputs of the target model [24, 25].
Despite this diversity, a commonality in most existing approaches is the treatment of generating ad-
versarial attacks as a constrained optimization or search problem [5]. In this constrained optimization
paradigm, the objective is to search for a specific adversarial perturbation based on a particular input
datapoint, with the constraint that this perturbation is not too large. The constrained optimization
paradigm has led to a number of highly successful attack strategies, with whitebox attacks based on
first-order gradient information being particularly ubiquitous and successful. Examples of successful
strategies employing this approach include the classic Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10], as
well as more recent variants such as L-BFGS [33], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
[26], DeepFool [23], Carlini-Wagner [5] and the PGD attack [22], to name a few.
However, the constrained optimization paradigm has important limitations. For example, while
constrained optimization-based attack strategies are easily applicable to continuous input domains
(i.e., images), adapting them to new modalities, such as discrete textual data [18, 7, 8] or graph-
structured data that is non-i.i.d. [6, 38], represents a significant challenge [35, 32]. In addition, in the
constrained optimization approach, a specific optimization must be performed for each attacked input,
which generally only leads to a single or small set of non-diverse perturbations. As a consequence,
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constrained optimization approaches often fail to produce diverse attacks—which can make them
easier to defend against—and these approaches do not efficiently generalize to unseen examples,
since they require a new round of optimization to be performed for each attacked input.
Present work. We propose DAGAER (Domain-Agnostic Generative Adversarial Examples with
Resampling; pronounced “dagger”), a unified generative framework for whitebox adversarial attacks,
which is easily adaptable to different input domains and can efficiently generate diverse adversarial
perturbations. DAGAER leverages advancements in deep generative modeling to learn an encoder-
decoder based model with a stochastic latent variable that can be used to craft small perturbations.
Our approach offers three key benefits:
• Domain-agnostic. Our framework can be easily deployed in diverse domains (e.g., images, text,
or graphs) by simply choosing an appropriate encoder, decoder, and similarity function.
• Efficient generalization. Employing a parametric model with a stochastic latent variable allows
us to amortize the inference process when crafting adversarial examples. After training, we
can efficiently construct these adversarial examples and even generalize without any further
optimization to unseen test examples with only a single pass through the trained network.
• Diverse attacks. We learn a conditional distribution of adversarial examples, which can be
efficiently sampled to produce diverse attacks or used to resample when an initial attack fails.
To demonstrate the benefits of DAGAER we implement variants to attack CNN-based image classi-
fiers, LSTM-based text classifiers, and GNN-based node classification models. In the image domain,
our framework achieves results that are competitive with constrained optimization-based approaches
in terms of attack success rates, while providing more efficient generalization and diverse perturba-
tions. In the text domain, we provide strong results on the IMDB benchmark, being the first work to
scale an approach with state-of-the-art success rates to the full test set. Finally, in the graph domain,
our approach achieves a new state-of-the-art for attacking a GNN using node features alone.
2 Background and Preliminaries
Given a classifier f : X → Y , input datapoint x ∈ X , and class label y ∈ Y , where f(x) = y, the
goal of an adversarial attack is to produce a perturbed datapoint x′ ∈ X such that f(x′) = y′ 6= y,
and where the distance ∆(x, x′) between the original and perturbed points is sufficiently small.
Threat models. Adversarial attacks can be classified under different threat models, which impose
different access and resource restrictions on the attacker [1]. In this work we consider the whitebox
setting, where the attacker has full access to the model parameters and outputs. This setting is
more permissive than the blackbox [24, 25] and semi-whitebox [36] settings, which we consider for
test set attacks. Constrained optimization attacks in the whitebox setting are relatively mature and
well-understood, making it a natural setting to contrast our alternative generative modelling-based
attack strategy. In addition, we consider the more common setting of untargeted attacks, where the
goal of the attacker is to change the original classification decision to any other class.2
Constrained optimization approach. In the standard constrained optimization framework, the goal
is to find some minimal perturbation δ ∈ X that minimizes ∆(x, x+δ), subject to f(x+δ) = y′ and
x+ δ ∈ X , where the last constraint is added to ensure that the resulting x′ = x+ δ is still a valid
input (e.g., a valid image in normalized pixel space.) Rather than solving this non-convex optimization
problem directly, the typical approach is to relax the constraints into the objective function and to
employ standard gradient descent [10] or projected gradient descent, with the projection operator
restricting x′ such that ∆(x, x′) ≤  and x′ ∈ X [22].
Limitations of the constrained optimization approach. The constrained optimization formulation
has been effectively deployed in many recent works, especially for images (see [1] for a survey).
However, this approach has two key technical limitations:
1. Directly searching for an adversarial example x′ or an adversarial perturbation δ ∈ X can be
computationally expensive if the input space X is very high-dimensional or discrete (e.g., for text
or graphs). Moreover, adding the perturbation δ to x is only feasible if the input domain X is a
2Our framework could be extended to the targeted setting by modifying the loss function, as well as to
blackbox attacks via blackbox gradient estimation [34, 11], but we leave these extensions to future work.
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Figure 1: The main components of DAGAER and the forward generation of an adversarial example.
field with a well-defined notion of addition, which is not the case for discrete domains such as
text.
2. A distinct optimization procedure must be run separately for each attacked datapoint, and without
substantial modifications, this optimization will only yield a single (or small set) of non-diverse
perturbations per attacked datapoint.
Together, these limitations make it non-trivial to generalize the constrained optimization approach
beyond the image domain, and make it difficult to generate diverse attacks for unseen datapoints.
3 Proposed Approach
To address the limitations of the constrained optimization paradigm, we propose an alternative
approach based upon a generative modeling framework. The key insight in our framework is that
we learn a deep generative model of our target domain, and instead of searching over the original
input space X to generate an adversarial example, we learn to generate perturbations within a
low-dimensional, continuous latent space Rd.
3.1 Model overview
We seek to define an adversarial generator network, G, which specifies a conditional distribution
P (x′|x) over adversarial examples x′ given an input datapoint x. Without loss of generality, we
define a generic adversarial generator network as a combination of four components (Figure 1):
• A probabilistic encoder network, qφ(z|x) that defines a conditional distribution over latent
codes z ∈ Rd given an input xi ∈ X . For simplicity, we assume that this encoder relies on
the reparameterization trick via the Gaussian distribution [29], due to its attractive sampling
properties. That is, we specify the latent conditional distribution as z ∼ N (µφ(x), σφ(x)), where
µφ, σφ : X → Rd are differentiable neural networks. Following the reparameterization trick, we
sample from z ∼ qφ(z|x) by drawing  ∼ N (0, I) and returning z = µφ(x) + σφ(x) ◦ , where
◦ denotes the elementwise product.
• A probabilistic decoder network, pθ(δ|z) that maps a sampled latent code z ∈ Rd to a perturbation
δ. This function may be an arbitrary differentiable neural network.
• A combination function c(δ, x) that takes an input x and perturbation as input and outputs a
perturbed example x′. The combination function can be as simple as adding the perturbation to
the clean input—i.e., x′ = x+ δ—or more complex such as first projecting to a candidate set.
• A similarity function ∆ defined over X , used to restrict the space of adversarial examples. A
common choice is any lp-norm for continuous domains or an upper bound on the number of
actions performed if the domain is discrete.
The basic flow of our generator network is summarized in Figure 1: we use the encoder network to
sample a latent “perturbation code” z ∈ Rd given an input x ∈ X , and given this sampled code, we
then generate a perturbation δ = pθ(z) that is combined with our original input using the combination
function to generate the adversarial sample x′ = c(δ, x).
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This generic encoder-decoder framework for adversarial attacks can be easily adapted to different
domains (e.g., text, images, or graphs) by simply specifying domain-specific variants of the four
components above, with further details provided in Section 3.3. A substantial benefit of this generic
encoder-decoder framework is that the attacker can make use of domain-specific prior information
readily available in the input data through an appropriate choice of architecture. For example, if
the input is an image, its inherent structure can be exploited by using the inductive bias of CNNs.
Similarly, an appropriate choice for text data can be LSTMs and GNNs for graph-structured data.
Adversarial generalization. Unlike the constrained optimization approach, our framework also
allows us to amortize the inference process: instead of performing a specific optimization for each
attacked example, our trained encoder-decoder can efficiently generate a distribution of adversarial
examples on arbitrary input points, even points that were unseen during training. In addition, since
the output of our encoder qφ(z|x) is stochastic, we learn a distribution over adversarial examples,
making it possible to efficiently sample a diverse set of attacks. One key benefit of this fact is that
even when one adversarial sample generated through DAGAER is unsuccessful, it is computationally
inexpensive to generate another sample that may turn adversarial. In Section 4.2, we exploit this
phenomenon to resample new examples in cases where our first attempt fails to attack a model, and
show that this simple procedure can significantly improve attack generalization on a test set.
3.2 Training and loss function
To train our model we define a hybrid objective function that is composed of a misclassification loss,
Lc, that penalizes the model if the generated x′ points are not adversarial, as well as two regularizers.
Misclassification loss. We use a max-margin misclassification loss, since it has been shown to be
robust to hyperparameter settings [5]. Using s(x, y) ∈ R to denote the (unnormalized) relative
likelihood that the classifier f assigns to point x ∈ X belonging to class y ∈ Y , we define the
classification loss as:
Lc = 1
N
N∑
i
max(s(x′i, yi)− (s(x′i, y′i))maxy′
i
6=yi
, 0),
where yi is the correct class for the unperturbed point xi.
Regularization. To regularize the output perturbation, we penalize the model according to the
similarity ∆(x, x′) between the perturbed and unperturbed points. We also add a KL-regularizer in
the latent space between a uniform Gaussian prior and the distribution defined by z ∼ qφ(z|x), which
prevents the latent samples z from collapsing onto one specific latent code.
Overall objective and training. The overall objective is thus defined as follows:
L = Lc + 1
N
N∑
i
(−λ ·∆(xi, x′i) +DKL(qφ(z|xi) || N (0, 1)). (1)
Learning in this setting consists of first sampling a mini-batch of unperturbed samples and then
running them through the adversarial generator G, which attempts to fool every example in the mini-
batch before updating in an end-to-end fashion through stochastic gradient descent. Our approach
closely resembles that of a variational auto-encoder (VAE) with a Gaussian prior on the latent space
[14]. However, unlike a standard VAE, our objective function is an adversarial loss and not the usual
cross-entropy objective. Moreoever, the reconstruction error in Equation (1) is given by an arbitrary
similarity function ∆, with a hyperparameter λ that trades-off the adversarial misclassification
objective from the magnitude of the perturbation by maximizing the similarity.
3.3 Implementations in different input domains
To deploy the DAGAER framework on a particular input domain, one simply needs to specify
domain-specific implementations of the four key components: an encoder network, decoder network,
combination function, and a similarity function.
Attacks on image classification. Following standard practice in the image domain, we define
the encoder qφ(z|x) to be a convolutional neural network (CNN) and the decoder pθ(z) to be a
deconvolutional network. The combination function is defined to be simple addition c(δ, x) = x+ δ
4
and we define ∆ to be the l2 distance. Thus, in this setting our adversarial generator network G
simply uses a generative model to output a small perturbation in continuous pixel space.
Attacks on text classification. In the text setting, we define the input x = (x1, ..., xT ) to be a
sequence of T words from a fixed vocabulary V , and we seek to generate x′ as an equal-length
perturbed sequence of words. Since we are focusing on attacking recurrent neural networks (RNNs),
we also assume that every word w ∈ V is associated with an embedding vector E(w) ∈ Rd,
via a known embedding function E : V → Rd. We use an LSTM [12] encoder qφ(z|x) to map
the sequence (E(x1), ..., E(xT )) of input word embeddings to a latent vector z. The decoder
qφ(z|x) is then defined as an LSTM that maps the latent code z to a sequence of T perturbation
vectors δ = (δ1, ..., δT ), with δi ∈ Rd. To generate a valid sequence of words, we combine each
perturbation δi with the corresponding input word embeddingE(xi) and employ a projection function
ΠX : Rd → V to map each perturbed embedding to valid vocabulary word via a nearest-neighbor
lookup in the embedding space.
Note, however, that the discrete nature of the projection operator ΠX represents a challenge for end-
to-end training. One option is to simply define the combination function as c(δi, xi) = ΠX (E(xi) +
δi) and omit the discrete projection during training (similar to [9]), but—as we will show in the
experiments (Section 4.2)—this leads to sub-optimal attacks.
To address this issue, we develop a differentiable nearest neighbour attention mechanism (inspired by
[28]), where for each word xi in the input sequence x, we define the combination function c(xi, δi)
with a tunable temperature parameter τ as:
x′i = c(δi, xi) = ΠX
(∑
w∈V
exp(αw/τ)E(w)∑
w′∈V exp(αw′/τ)
)
(2)
where αw denotes the angular distance between the perturbed embedding E(xi) + δi and the
embedding E(w) of vocabulary word w ∈ V . As with images, we use the l2 norm on the embeddings
as the similarity function.
Attacks on node classification. The final domain we consider is the setting of semi-supervised
node classification using graph neural networks (GNNs) [15, 30]. We consider the challenging
attack setting where the attack model can only make changes to node attributes and not the graph
structure itself [38]—employing a graph convolution network (GCN) [15] as the encoder network
and a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) as the decoder. Note, however, that adversarial attacks on graphs
present unique complications compared to texts and images in that the training data is non-i.i.d., with
the training points being a sub-sample of the nodes in a large graph. Thus, following Zugner et al.
[38], we consider both direct attacks, which modify the features of the target nodes themselves as well
as influencer attacks, which can only modify features in the neighborhood of a target node but not the
node itself. Consequently, we define two sets of disjoint nodes: the attacker set A, and the target set
T . For direct attacks A = T and in this case the combination function is simply c(δ, x) = x+ δ. For
influencer attacks, only the embeddings of the A are modified and thus we use a binary mask in our
combination function —i.e. c(δ, x) = x+ b · δ, where b ∈ [0, 1]N . Again, we use the l2 norm as the
similarity function.
4 Experiments
We investigate the application of our generative framework to produce adversarial examples against
classification tasks where the input domain is one of natural images, textual data and graph-structured
data. Through our experiments we seek to answer the following questions:
(Q1) Domain Agnostic. Can we use the same attack strategy across multiple domains?
(Q2) Attack Generalization. Is it possible to adversarially generalize to unseen examples?
(Q3) Diversity of Attacks. Can we generate diverse sets of adversarial examples?
As points of comparison throughout our experiments, we consider constrained optimization-based
baselines specific to the different domains we examine (and which use comparable setups). We also
experiment with a simplified version of DAGAER that uses a deterministic autoencoder, rather than a
variational approach (denoted DAGAER-AE). Code to reproduce our experiments is included with
the submission and will be made public.
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Figure 2: Left Unperturbed images from CIFAR10. Middle Attacked images with λ = 0.1. Right:
Perturbation magnified by a factor of 10 for sake of visualization.
Table 1: Adversarial text example for the IMBD dataset. The original review was classified as
negative; the adversarial example changes this classification to positive.
Original: hardly a masterpiece. not so well written. beautiful cinematography i think not. this movie
wasn’t too terrible but it wasn’t that much better than average. the main story dealing with highly
immoral teens should have focused more on the forbidden romance and why this was...
Adversarial: hardly a masterpiece not so well vanilla beautiful mystery, i think annoying this movie
wasn’t too terrible but it wasn’t that much better than vanilla the main story anymore with highly
compromising lovers, should have focused more on the forbidden romance and why this lovers
4.1 Datasets and Target Models
We attack popular neural network classification models across image, text, and graph classification
using standard benchmark datasets.
Image domain. We use the CIFAR10 [16, 17] dataset for image classification (with standard train/test
splits), and attack a CNN classification model based on the VGG16 architecture. The target CNN
model is trained for 100 epochs with the Adam optimizer with learning rate fixed at 1e− 4.
Text domain. We use the IMDB dataset for sentiment classification (with standard train/test splits)
[21]. The target classifier is a single-layer LSTM model, initialized with pretrained GloVe embeddings
[27] and trained for 10 epochs with the Adam optimizer at default settings. Note that we focus on
word-level attacks and thus omit a detailed comparison with and discussion of character-level heuristic
approaches (e.g., [18, 7]).
Graph domain. We consider two standard node classification datasets, Cora and CiteSeer [20, 4, 31].
We split the dataset into labeled 20% of which 10% is used for training and the remaining is used for
validation. The remaining nodes are unlabeled nodes and are used for testing purposes. We attack a
single-layer graph convolutional network (GCN) model [15] that is trained for 100 epochs with the
Adam optimizer and a learning rate of 1e− 2. Following previous work, we consider both direct and
influencer attacks (as discussed in Section 3.3); in the influencer setting we attack a node by changing
the features of a random sample of 5 of its neighbors.3
4.2 Results
We now address the core experimental questions (Q1-Q3), highlighting the peformance of DAGAER
across the three distinct domains.
Q1: Domain Agnostic. Our first set of experiments focus on demonstrating that DAGAER can
achieve strong performance across three distinct input domains. Overall, we find that DAGAER
performs competitively in the image setting (Table 2) and achieves very strong results in the text (Table
3) and graph (Table 4) domains. However, we emphasize that these results are meant to demonstrate
the flexibility of DAGAER across distinct domains; an exhaustive comparison within each domain—
especially for images—would necessitate a greater variety of benchmarks and evaluation settings.
For the image domain our baselines are the l2-variants of the PGD [22] and Carlini-Wagner [5]
attacks. We find that DAGAER performs competitively with the baselines with a small drop of 8% in
performance for the DAGAER model and a smaller drop of 3% for the DAGAER-AE model (Table
2). Figure 2 provides an example of the perturbations generated by our approach.
For the text domain, we report the results with and without the differentiable nearest neighbor
mechanism (Equation 2), with the latter also applied to the DAGAER-AE baseline for fair comparison.
3If there are fewer than 5 neighbors we randomly sample nodes from A until we have a total of 5
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Table 2: Attack success rate of DAGAER and DAGAER-AE on CIFAR-10 for Training and Test
splits. We used λ = 0.1 and the test set results are averaged over 10 runs.
DAGAER DAGAER-AE PGD [22] Carlini-Wagner [5]
Train 92% 97% 100% 100%
Test 81% 67% - -
Table 3: Attack success rate of DAGAER and DAGAER-AE on IMDB for Train and Test splits. We
used λ = 0.05 and and cap the number words changed to 15% of the sample length.
DAGAER-AE DAGAER-AE-Diff DAGAER DAGAER-Diff FGSM [9] DF [9]
Train 6% 44% 9% 71% 32% 36%
Test 18% 45% 20% 61% - -
We compare against results reported in Gong et al. [9] for their FGSM baseline and DeepFool model.
We find that DAGAER outperforms both these baselines, with the differentiable nearest-neighbour
mechanism being crucial to prevent overfitting (Table 3; see Table 1 for an example attack, with
further details in the Appendix). Figure 4 plots the tradeoff in adversarial success between the
perturbation regularization and percentage of tokens changed. As expected, more regularization
induces less text change, at the expense of lower performance. Note that we do not compare against
recently reported results on Alzantot et al.’s genetic attack algorithm [2], since it has not been scaled
beyond a small subset of the IMDB data and requires significantly truncating the review text.
Finally, in the graph domain, we find that our DAGAER-AE baseline achieves a new state-of-the-art
for direct attacks (when modifying node features only), outperforming the constrained optimization
NetAttack approach [38] and achieving a perfect success rate on the training set (Table 4). Both
DAGAER-AE and DAGAER also significantly outperform NetAttack in the influencer attack setting,
with the latter seeing an absolute improvement of 29% and 16% on Cora and CiteSeer, respectively.
Note that we do not compare against the graph attack framework of Dai et al. [6], since that work
modifies the adjacency matrix of the graph, whereas we modify node features only.
Q2: Attack Generalization. We demonstrate the ability of DAGAER to a attack a test set of
previously unseen instances, with results summarized under the Test columns in Tables 2-4. Since
constrained optimization-based attack strategies cannot generalize to a test set of examples, we
rely on our DAGAER-AE approach as a strong baseline. In all three domains DAGAER is able to
generalize effectively, outperforming DAGAER-AE in the image setting and in the text setting. For
graph attacks we observe that DAGAER has marginally better generalization ability for influencer
attacks while DAGAER-AE performs better by a similar margin in the easier direct attack setting.
Q3: Diversity of Attacks. DAGAER exhibits comparable (or marginally worse) performance
compared to our deterministic autoencoder (DAGAER-AE) approach in terms of raw success rates.
However, a key benefit of the full DAGAER framework is that it has a stochastic latent state, which
allows for resampling of latent codes to produce new adversarial examples. We empirically verify
this phenomena by resampling failed test set examples up to a maximum of 100 resamples. As
can be seen from Figure 3, DAGAER can produce adversarial samples for clean inputs that were
originally classified correctly, significantly boosting generalization performance. Specifically, we
observed that 71% of correctly classified test samples could be successfully attacked for CIFAR10
after 100 resamples. Similarly, for IMDB there is an average absolute improvement of 60%. For the
graph setting we resample test set instances for direct attacks and failed training set instances for
influencer attacks but still without any further optimization. We achieve significant improvements
of 36% and 61% for Cora and CiteSeer direct attacks, respectively, and 47% and 8% for Cora and
CiteSeer influencer attacks, respectively.
5 Further Related Work
Here, we provide a brief discussion of related work that we have not previously discussed (e.g, in
Sections 1 and 4), and that is highly relevant to our proposed framework. For more comprehensive
overviews of recent advancements in adversarial attacks, we direct the interested reader to survey
papers for adversarial attacks in the image [1], text [35], and graph domains [32].
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Table 4: Attack success rate of DAGAER and DAGAER-AE on Graph Data. For Influencer attacks
we only consider the training set. We used λ = 0.01 and results are averaged over 5 runs.
Cora Train Cora Test CiteSeer Train CiteSeer Test
DAGAER-Direct 88 % 91 % 81% 82%
DAGAER-AE-Direct 100% 93% 100% 92%
Zugner-Direct 99% - 99% -
DAGAER-Influencer 62% - 54 % -
DAGAER-AE-Influencer [38] 60% - 52% -
Zugner-Influencer [38] 33 % - 38% -
Figure 3: Attack Success Rate when resampling
only failed adversarial examples in the test set.
Figure 4: Tradeoff in attack success rate and
word error rate with respect to λ.
Adversarial attacks using parametric models. Similar to our approach, there is relevant previous
work on generating adversarial images using parametric models, such as the Adversarial Transfor-
mation Networks (ATN) framework and its variants [3, 36]. However, unlike our approach, they are
specific to the image domain and do not define a generative distribution over adversarial examples.
Adversarial attacks in latent space. There is a burgeoning literature of attacks that are crafted in
a latent space, similar to the framework proposed here. For instance, Zhao et al. [37] propose a
framework to generate “natural” adversarial examples that lie on the data manifold. However, unlike
our work, their “natural adversary” requires a search procedure to generate an adversarial example
and does not facilitate an efficient generation of diverse attacks like DAGAER. Concurrent to our
work, Li et al. [19] introducedNAttack to produce distributions of adversarial examples for blackbox
image-based attacks. While similar in spirit to our framework and relatively efficient, NAttack is
specific to the image domain and operates within a constrained optimization paradigm—requiring
additional rounds of optimization to generate adversarial examples on unseen data.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We present DAGAER, a unified framework for constructing domain agnostic adversarial attacks. We
deploy our strategy on three domains—images, text and graphs—and successfully show that our
trained model is capable of generating adversarial examples on unseen test examples in a new form
of attack generalization. Further, we show that the generative nature DAGAER makes our framework
capable of generating diverse sets of attacks for any given input, allowing the attacker to cheaply
resample failed attacks in an another attempt to be adversarial.
In terms of limitations and directions for future work, we considered only a simple latent code which
is a reparametrized Gaussian. Exploring and extending DAGAER to more complex distributions
using modern generative modelling methods, such as normalizing flows, is a natural direction for
future work. Extending DAGAER to the blackbox setting (e.g., using relaxed gradient estimators)
is another fruitful direction for future work. Finally, while this work demonstrates the significant
promise of a generative approach to adversarial attacks, further empirical studies, e.g., using various
adversarial defense strategies, are necessary to more completely characterize the pros and cons of
this approach compared to the constrained optimization paradigm.
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A Implementation Details
We summarize the application of DAGAER framework to the different domains considered in the
paper. In general we found it useful to spend multiple computation cycles on a particular batch before
moving on to the next batch. We used an upper limit of 40 gradient computations per batch or untill
all examples in the batch were misclassified and the δ was lower than some threshold. To tune our
hyperparameters we used the same train/validation splits that were used to train the target classifier.
Table 5: Summary of the different components to applying our framework to different input domains
ATTACK DOMAIN INPUT TYPE ENCODER DECODER δ ∆ c(x, δ)
IMAGE PIXELS CNN CNN PIXELS l2 x+ δ
TEXT-EMB WORD EMB LSTM LSTM WORD EMB l2 x+ δ
TEXT-TOKEN DISCRETE TOKEN LSTM LSTM WORD EMB l2 ΠX (x+ δ)
GRAPH-DIRECT NODE EMB GCN MLP NODE EMB l2 x+ δ
GRAPH-INFLUENCER NODE EMB GCN MLP NODE EMB l2 x+ b · δ
We now detail exact configuration of hyperparameter settings used in all of our experiments.
Image.
Table 6: Hyperparameter and experimental details for the image domain
Parameter Description Value
Generator Architecture DenseNet121 -
Latent size AE and DAGAER latent posterior size 50
Noise radius Standard deviation for Gaussian noise 0.2
Learning rate SGD Learning rate for the target LSTM model 0.01
Optimizer DAGAER optimizer Adam [13]
λ L2 regularization coefficient 0.1
Batch size For training and testing 256
GPU For training and testing 2 Nvidia 1080 Ti
Similarity function Metric used for ∆ l2-distance
Text.
For DAGAER-Diff we began training with a softmax temperature τ 1 for the differentiable nearest
neighbour mechanism. After every 20 batches, we decreased τ with a decay rate of 0.9 until τ
reached a minimum 0.01.
Table 7: Hyperparameter and experimental details for the text domain
Parameter Description Value
LSTM size Hidden layer size for target model 300
Gradient clipping norm The clipping norm for the target LSTM model when training 1
Latent size AE and DAGAER latent posterior size 50
Noise radius Standard deviation for Gaussian noise 0.2
Learning rate SGD Learning rate for the target LSTM model 0.01
Optimizer DAGAER optimizer Adam [13]
λ L2 regularization coefficient for embedding perturbation 0.05
Batch size For training and testing 128
Embedding size Glove embeddings, determined by target model 300
GPU 2 Tesla P100
Max input length Maximum length for IMDB text 200
Similarity function Metric used for ∆ l2-distance
Distance function Metric used for the nearest neighbour function Angular distance
12
Graph.
Table 8: Hyperparameter and experimental details for the Graph domain
Parameter Description Value
Generator Architecture GCN Encoder and MLP Decoder -
GCN hidden size Number of features for 1-layer GCN 16
Attack Epochs Number of Epochs for DAGAERtraining 200
Latent size AE and DAGAER latent posterior size 50
Dropout Ratio Used for Regularization 0.5
|T | Number of Target Nodes 40
Learning rate Learning rate for G 0.01
Optimizer DAGAER optimizer Adam [13]
λ L2 regularization coefficient 0.01
Batch size For training and testing 256
GPU For training and testing 1 Nvidia 1080 Ti
Similarity function Metric used for ∆ l2-distance
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B Additional Results
Training resutls on IMDB.
Table 9: Attack success rate of DAGAER and DAGAER-AE on IMDB for Train and Test splits. We
used λ = 0.05 and the test set results and cap the number words changed to 15% of the sample length.
“Emb” rows correspond to success rate where the target model receives perturbed embeddings as input
(no tokens), whereas “Proj” rows correspond to the success rate where the perturbed embeddings are
first projected to nearest neighbour embeddings, and then passed to the target model. The latter setup
correspond to a realistic application where only adversarial tokens are used as input. Additionally,
we used 20% of the training set for validation.
DAGAER-AE DAGAER-AEDiff DAGAER DAGAER-Diff FGSM [9] DF [9]
Train-Emb 96 86% 94% 58% 88% 45%
Train-Proj 6% 44% 9% 71% 32% 36%
Test-Emb 72% 76% 70% 56% - -
Test-Proj 18% 45% 20% 61% - -
Adversarial Image Examples.
Figure 5: Left Unperturbed images from CIFAR10. Middle Attacked images with λ = 0.1. Right:
Perturbation magnified by a factor of 10 for sake of visualization.
Adversarial Text Examples.
Table 10: Adversarial text example for the IMBD dataset. The original review was classified as
negative; the adversarial example changes this classification to positive.
Original: i saw this film yesterday. i must admit, it weren’t my cup of tea. although it’s supposed to
be a horror movie of its kind. but as i was watching this, i was ’this movie isn’t making any sense
at where on earth did this guy in the dark coat came from? where were the two guys were going
when they left the girls where on earth did a shark came out /><br />all these elements in this film
somehow didn’t add up.
Adversarial: i saw this film arid i must listings it is, my cup of (overall although it’s supposed to be
a horror movie of its 7 but as i was watching this, i was chief movie isn’t making any sense at where
on earth did this guy in the dark arid came redspin-offs where were the two guys were going when
they left the girls where on earth did a 7 came out /><br andre these elements in this film somehow
didn’t add up.
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